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FEATURE ARTICLE
Assessing Hospital Cooperation
Laws
by James F Blumstein
Introduction
How to control health care costs while
preserving the quality of care has been the focal
point of much health policy discussion at the fed-
eral and state level for many years and will doubt-
less continue to be of importance in the future.
Philosophically and historically, there has been
debate as to the role of market forces and com-
petition in allocating resources in the health care
industry. Traditionally, many analysts have
viewed the health care arena as inhospitable to
the functioning of the economic marketplace. For
them, cooperation among health care providers
coupled with regulation is an appropriate ap-
proach for achieving economic efficiency.' More
recently, evidence of normal competitive behav-
ior in the health care industry2 has led many
policymakers and analysts to conclude that a dose
of competition is what the doctor should order.'
And, since "[a]ntitrust law is the virtual engine
of the market paradigm,"4 market-oriented, pro-
competitive policies contemplate an appropriate
role for antitrust enforcement to assure a free and
competitive marketplace.'
The primary purpose of
antitrust legislation is to promote
competition in the market place in Mr. Blum'
order to achieve economic effi- sity Law
ciency and thereby to improve the Dartmout
well being of consumers. Federal elected m
antitrust legislation prohibits con- B.A. and
spiracies to restrain trade,' mo- versity, w
nopolization and attempts to mo-
nopolize,8 anticompetitive exclu-
sive dealing arrangements, 9 mergers and acqui-
sitions that adversely affect competition, 0 un-
fair or deceptive practices with a significant im-
pact on competition," and discriminatory pric-
ing that lessens competition.'2 Antitrust laws
promote competition in order to achieve an effi-
cient allocation of resources '1 - goods and
services should be available to consumers at the
lowest price for a given quality level.
In something of a rejection of market-ori-
ented initiatives and a throwback to the tradi-
tional regulatory approach, a number of states
recently have enacted legislation that authorizes
hospitals or health care providers to enter into
cooperative agreements. In the absence of such
legislation, cooperative agreements among com-
petitors would be subject to federal and state
antitrust laws. 4 While these cooperation laws
enable cooperative efforts among health care pro-
viders, 5 they permit such activity only under
certain circumstances. The statutes establish
elaborate schemes for securing approval, weigh-
ing, among other factors, the possible adverse
impact of cooperative conduct on competition.
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State administrators, typically health depart-
ments, are allowed to balance the benefits
claimed to be achieved through cooperative
agreements against possible anticompetitive re-
sults. 16
This paper examines the nature of the
health care market and its evolution, explains the
legal basis for state conferral of antitrust immu-
nity for hospital cooperative conduct, reviews
federal antitrust hospital industry enforcement
guidelines, and summarizes the hospital coop-
eration laws. The paper concludes with a dis-
cussion of the likely impact of the hospital co-
operation laws on the consumer.
The changing hospital and health care
market
The nature of competition in the health
care field and among hospitals is changing. Be-
cause of the prevalence of nearly complete third-
party insurance coverage for hospital services,
there was very little price competition until the
early 1980s. 7 Because of legislative changes that
have encouraged competition and cost control
and because of changes in the way health care
services are being purchased, price competition
exists and has been demonstrated in some areas
of the country and seems to have emerged in
many more markets in the past few years. Stud-
ies regarding price competition have focused on
California because data are available and a high
percentage of the population is covered by in-
surers who contract competitively with provid-
ers. Since ninety millionAmericans are covered
by HMOs and discount medical networks, '"
price competition is likely to be an important
market feature in other parts of the country.
Historical background
Historically, influenced by the institu-
tional structure and environment in which they
functioned, hospitals and the markets in which
they operate have behaved in a somewhat differ-
ent manner from other industries and their mar-
kets.' 9 Until recently, three participants in the
hospital market - physicians, patients, and hos-
pitals - operated in an environment in which
price was not an overriding consideration; in-
surance paid for treatment considered appropri-
ate by the physician and paid at a price set by the
providers - the physicians and hospitals. 20
Among the participants in the market, phy-
sicians have been the most influential; 2' because
of their experience and training, they have much
more specialized knowledge and expertise than
patients. 22 The professional dominance model 23
has resulted from (and in turn has reinforced) 24
this asymmetry of information. 25 Under the tra-
ditional professional paradigm, patients rely on
the recommendations of their physician. With
the prevalence of third-party insurance for hos-
pital stays, patients could receive hospital ser-
vices for relatively small out-of-pocket pay-
ments. 26 Because of physicians' traditional abil-
ity to channel patients, hospitals have been de-
pendent on physicians to admit patients to their
facilities.27 Competition among hospitals has
focused on attracting referrals of patients by phy-
sicians. In that type of competitive environment,
emphasis among competitor hospitals is on the
wishes of physicians, and neither the hospital nor
the physician in such circumstances has much
of an incentive to be responsive to considerations
of cost. This general picture is still true in many
parts of the United States; in some areas, how-
ever, payers - increasingly important, increas-
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ingly cost-conscious, and increasingly active
participants in the market - exert their influ-
ence and change the hospital and the health care
market.28
Normally, increased competition in a
market can be expected to lead to greater effi-
ciency and lower prices.29 Early studies on the
effects of hospital competition led to the seem-
ingly paradoxical conclusion that increased com-
petition led to higher prices.3° This led to the
familiar "medical arms race" hypothesis, where
purchases of expensive equipment led to similar
purchases by other institutions without respect
to cost effectiveness. 3' The tradition of profes-
sional dominance, the predominance of third-
party insurance, and the overall lack of incen-
tives for cost consciousness meant that cost con-
siderations were not an issue for competitive
contesting among hospitals. Competition among
hospitals, therefore, did not focus on price but
rather on other, non-price dimensions, as in other
industries (such as heavily regulated industries)
where the terms of competition are constrained.
Frequently, competitive activity was directed to
providing costly amenities for patients and so-
phisticated equipment for physicians (with the
necessary staff required to operate the equip-
ment).32 This resulted in increased overhead for
each institution and in the unwarranted duplica-
tion of services in the marketplace.33
The syllogism for competitive success was
quite straightforward. Hospitals succeeded by
filling beds. Filled beds derived from referrals,
since patients traditionally have typically been
admitted to a hospital by a physician. Physicians
controlled patient flow through control of patient
referrals. Hospitals, therefore, competed among
themselves for patients by vying for the affilia-
tion of local physicians;' to gain physician af-
filiations, hospitals provided expensive special-
ized clinical services.35 Given the structure of
the marketplace, and the existing structure of
incentives, hospitals in competitive markets had
higher costs than those without competitors. Part
of the reason for this phenomenon, apparently,
was the inappropriate duplication of services.36
"Hospitals in monopolistic positions within their
local area produce[d] their services at signifi-
cantly lower costs than hospitals in more com-
petitive environments. 37 With payments to
hospitals reflecting a cost-based system, in which
hospitals were reimbursed for their legitimate
expenditures (including capital outlays), there
was little incentive for any relevant
decisionmaker to take costs into consideration.
As a result, the hospital market seemed38 to func-
tion differently from other markets - greater
competition correlated with higher rather than
lower prices.39
Recent market changes
Legislative changes' and insurer and em-
ployer attention to health care costs4 have
changed the dynamic of the health care industry
in some parts of the country. This suggests that
when the health care marketplace is restructured
to reflect incentives like other markets, health
care participants and markets behave in like fash-
ion.
In 1982, California enacted legislation (ef-
fective in 1983) that allowed health insurance
plans (private third parties and the state Medic-
aid program) to contract selectively with health
care providers.42 This enabled private insurance
plans and Medi-Cal (California's Medicaid pro-
gram) to channel their beneficiaries to selected
providers in exchange for price and other con-
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cessions. This change introduced price competi-
tion in the California health care market as in-
surance plans and Medi-Cal bargained with hos-
pitals and other providers.4 3 In 1983, federal leg-
islation established the prospective payment sys-
tem ("PPS") for hospitals treating Medicare pa-
tients.' Under PPS, hospitals are paid a fixed
fee for a range of defined services called diag-
nosis-related groups ("DRGs").45 Finally,
HMOs 4 and PPOs,47 entities which bargain for
discounts from hospitals, grew rapidly.48 With
the introduction of
cost-conscious pay-
ers into the health
care field, incentives
shifted. As a result,
price competition as
well as quality com-
petition began to
emerge. 49
Data from
1980 through 1985
show that in Califor-
nia the new payment policies, and the concomi-
tant shift in economic incentives for participants
in the marketplace, dramatically reduced the rate
of increase in total hospital costs and revenues
and caused a shift to less expensive outpatient
services.50 About 80 percent of the population
of California is covered either by Medicare (and
is therefore subject to DRGs) or managed care
organizations (with their careful attention to
costs); and thus hospitals now have strong in-
centives to reduce costs.5 I The 1983-85 rate of
growth of hospital costs was lower than the 1980-
82 rate for all categories except for out-patient
services;5 2 for hospitals in highly competitive
areas, total inpatient costs (adjusted for inflation)
declined by 11.3 percent while remaining flat in
low-competition markets.53 In the period from
1983 to 1988, high HMO market penetration
stimulated more price competitive behavior on
the part of traditional health insurers. When such
insurers were permitted to contract with hospi-
tals for discounts, they did so, and that led to a
reduction in costs. 54
Thus, there is reason to think that in com-
petitive hospital markets, when appropriately
structured, the standard economic assumption
that competition lowers prices or decreases the
price/cost margin is
true. 5 A payer-
driven market is
characterized by the
presence of purchas-
ers who are moti-
vated and capable56
price shoppers.57
The influence of
payors is typical in
the traditional mar-
ketplace, as payors
determine the levels (quantity and quality) of ser-
vices that will be purchased. This reflects a grow-
ing influence of market-driven behavior and a
parallel erosion of the professional model, in
which issues of quality and style of practice are
typically decisions of the professional practitio-
ners who act (presumably in a fiduciary capac-
ity) on behalf of their patients (but without in-
centives for constraining costs).5 8
Understanding how hospital markets
function and how hospitals compete clearly has
implications for antitrust policies. If hospitals
compete primarily in non-price ways, intensify-
ing competition will very likely increase con-
sumer costs and prices.59 However, if hospitals
can be induced to compete even partially by
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price, maintaining potentially competitive mar-
kets is important so that consumers may realize
the benefits of price competition.' Antitrust
enforcement will require sensitivity to distinc-
tions between pro and anticompetitive combina-
tions.6' It seems that existing antitrust doctrine
is well equipped to allow the drawing of those
distinctions,62 and recent evidence suggests that
the federal antitrust enforcement officials are
aware of and sensitive to these concerns.63
The conferral of state immunity
The state-enacted hospital cooperation
laws, which exempt certain cooperative agree-
ments among hospitals or health care providers
from federal antitrust laws, are based on the
Parker v. Brown' state-action immunity doc-
trine. Although in enacting the antitrust laws,
Congress has exercised its constitutional com-
merce power to the maximum; 65 in Parker, the
Supreme Court deferred to federalism' and es-
tablished a form of "inverse preemption."67 By
appropriate legislative and regulatory action, a
state can immunize the conduct of private par-
ties from the application of the federal antitrust
laws. Thus, federal antitrust law is "subject to
supersession by state regulatory programs" '68 that
substitute regulation for competition, provided
that the state clearly articulates its policy and
actively supervises it.69
Parker v. Brown7" concerned an antitrust
challenge to California's Raisin Proration Pro-
gram, which authorized the state to appropriate
a portion of each producer's output in order to
stabilize raisin prices. This was a clear effort by
the state to restrict competition among raisin
growers7 , yet the Court found no violation of
the Sherman Act. The Court reasoned that the
Sherman Act prohibited individual action, not
state action. 72 Even though the California pro-
gram would have violated the antitrust laws "if
it were organized and made effective solely" by
collective action of "private persons," the
Sherman Act does not "restrain a state or its of-
ficers or agents from activities directed by its
legislature"73 and therefore does not apply "to
anticompetitive restraints imposed by the States
'as an act of government.' 74
In California Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
MidcalAluminum, Inc.,7 the Court clarified the
requirements for a state to confer antitrust im-
munity successfully on a private party.76 Two
standards must be satisfied. First, the challenged
restraint must be clearly articulated and affirma-
tively expressed as state policy;77 in this regard,
a state policy that permits but does not compel
anticompetitive conduct can be considered
"clearly articulated. '78 Second, the policy must
be actively supervised by the state itself.79 Ac-
tual' and not just potential" supervision by the
state is required. 82 Because, with respect to pri-
vate conduct, "there is a real danger that [the
private party] is acting to further [its] own inter-
ests, rather than the governmental interests of the
State, 83 the state must "exercise ultimate con-
trol over the challenged anticompetitive con-
duct .... The mere presence of some state involve-
ment or monitoring does not suffice."84
Thus, passive ratification of private
anticompetitive conduct will not suffice to es-
tablish Parker immunity. Parker "shelter[s] only
the particular anticompetitive acts of private par-
ties that, in the judgment of the State, actually
further state regulatory policies."85 Further, and
of fundamental importance, those specific acts
must be subject to "ongoing regulation by the
State. 86 The government's duty to supervise
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persists if the conferral of immunity is to be ef-
fective. Active supervision must be an ongoing
process, not a momentary event.
Parker immunity is "disfavored. 87 To sat-
isfy the requirements of Parker, "[s]tates must
accept political responsibility for actions they in-
tend to undertake."88 A state's decision to sub-
stitute a regime of regulation for the national
policy of competition as reflected in the federal
antitrust laws must be "implemented in its spe-
cific details"8 9 to as-
sure that the
"anticompetitive
scheme is the State's
own."'9 The supervi-
sion must not merely
be that of lip service
to the formalities of
regulation, thereby
hiding inaction by the
regulating agencies. 9'
The requirement of
active state supervi-
sion is to prevent private parties from taking ad-
vantage of a state regulatory scheme for their own
private interests.92
The validity of the hospital cooperation
laws is likely to rest on satisfying the "active su-
pervision" standard. Because the laws typi-
cally express the desire to supersede the federal
antitrust laws in pursuit of statutorily articulated
state policy objectives, the clear articulation test
is probably met.9
State hospital cooperation laws
Despite the positive effects on economic
behavior and consumer benefit that the antitrust
laws seek to promote, at least nineteen94 states
have enacted laws to immunize behavior by hos-
pitals or health care providers that otherwise
might be subject to federal antitrust scrutiny.95
These laws allow cooperative agreements among
hospitals or health care providers based on the
Parker v. Brown96 state-action doctrine. These
statutes vary significantly in the scope of cover-
age and the sophistication of approach. Some
follow a standardized legislative model while
others are unique. Some have broad coverage,
others are quite lim-
ited in scope.
Although
the statutes all differ
from one another
(even those based on
the legislative
model), Tennessee's
may be used as an
example of the pro-
visions and proce-
dures frequently in-
cluded in the stat-
utes. The Tennessee statute applies to coopera-
tive agreements between or among two or more
hospitals regarding the sharing, allocation or re-
ferral of patients, personnel, services and facili-
ties; it does not cover other health care provid-
ers.97 There are three specific limitations on the
scope of cooperative activity that can be ap-
proved under the terms of the statute. The stat-
ute does not authorize hospitals pursuant to a
cooperation agreement: 1) to operate as health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) without be-
ing so licensed; 2) to negotiate terms with insur-
ers, HMOs, or PPOs otherwise prohibited under
the antitrust laws; or 3) to permit referrals to pro-
vider-owned facilities otherwise prohibited by
law.98
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Hospitals may enter into agreements if the
likely benefits stemming from the agreements
outweigh any disadvantages attributable to a re-
duction in competition that may result.99 Parties
to such an agreement may apply to the depart-
ment of health for a certificate of public advan-
tage and must also submit the application to the
attorney general. The attorney general and the
health department are entrusted with the active
and continuing oversight of all cooperative agree-
ments.' ° The department of health reviews the
application and may hold a public hearing. The
department is required to give public notice and
to allow interested parties to intervene. After
consultation and agreement with the attorney
general, the department may issue a certificate
of public advantage for a cooperative agreement
if it determines that the applicants have demon-
strated by clear and convincing evidence that the
likely benefits resulting from the agreement out-
weigh any disadvantages attributable to a reduc-
tion in competition that may result.'0'
In evaluating the benefits, the department
is required to consider whether one or more of
the following benefits may accrue: a) enhanced
quality of hospital care; b) preservation of hos-
pital services in geographic proximity to com-
munities traditionally so served; c) gains in cost
efficiency of services provided by the hospitals
involved; d) improvements in utilization of hos-
pital resources; and e) avoidance of duplication
of hospital resources. Additionally the depart-
ment is required to evaluate at least the follow-
ing potential disadvantages: 1) the adverse im-
pact on the ability of managed care organizations
or other providers to negotiate optimal payment
and service arrangements with hospitals and
other providers; 2) the extent of any reduction in
competition among health care providers other
than hospitals that is likely to result; 3) any ad-
verse impact on patients regarding quality, avail-
ability and price of health services; and 4) the
availability of arrangements that are less restric-
tive to competition to achieve the benefits
sought. 02
The department of health is required to
consult with the state attorney general regarding
any potential reduction in competition, and the
state attorney general may consult with the
United States Department of Justice or the Fed-
eral Trade Commission.0 3 Provision is made for
terminating a certificate of public advantage by
the department of health or the state attorney gen-
eral. I° Although the statute does not directly in-
voke the state-action immunity doctrine, it pro-
vides that a cooperative agreement approved
under procedures it sets forth is a lawful agree-
ment notwithstanding'0 5 any other provision of
law. 06
The Tennessee statute articulates a state
purpose and proposes to substitute state regula-
tion for competition.0 7 The first part of the state-
action immunity test, requiring clear articulation
of a state policy to substitute regulation for com-
petition, would therefore seem to be met. How-
ever, the "active supervision" requirement, which
mandates ongoing supervision by the state to
assure that governmental (not private) policies
are being pursued, 0 8 raises substantial questions.
While the attorney general and the health depart-
ment are entrusted with the active and continu-
ing oversight of cooperative agreements, there
are no procedures within the statute that require
continuing governmental supervision after the
approval process and the issuance of a certifi-
cate of public advantage. Proposed Tennessee
regulations require every holder of a certificate
of public advantage to submit quarterly reports
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and compliance certificates to the health depart-
ment. The health commissioner may require
additional information and site visits."° Yet ac-
tual supervision must exist in fact, not just in
theory."' Mere passive ratification of private
decisions is not enough,"' and the unexercised
power to supervise is also insufficient" 2 to con-
fer Parker protection.
In the only major action taken under hos-
pital cooperation laws," 3 the Minnesota Com-
missioner of Health approved an agreement to
allow the merger of two hospital systems located
in the greater Minneapolis and Saint Paul areas. "14
The hospital systems did not fit within the DOJ/
FTC merger safety zone." 5 The Commissioner
found that the merger would result in cost sav-
ings to the users of the hospitals." 6 This was
shown through affidavits from major purchasers
of health care services in the area.' ' These affi-
davits indicated that through their contract ne-
gotiations with the hospitals savings had been
passed on to them." 8 Additionally, no purchas-
ers filed negative comments regarding the
merger.I" The affidavits also gave weight to the
argument that even post-merger, the market was
still competitive. 120 Arguably,' 2 1 the existence
of the state statute allowed a merger that will
achieve cost efficiencies and that, through state
oversight, will pass on savings to payers. 22
Antitrust guidelines for health care
One purpose of the hospital cooperation
laws may have been to deal with perceived prob-
lems of uneven or inappropriate application of
the antitrust laws to hospitals or other health care
providers.'" However, in response to requests
and criticisms from providers, in 1993 and again
in 1994, the Department of Justice and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission issued joint guidelines
regarding their antitrust enforcement policies in
the health care field. 124
The 1994 guidelines currently include
nine statements on enforcement policy and ana-
lytical principles in the following areas:
1) Mergers;
2) Hospital joint ventures
involving equipment;
3) Hospital joint ventures
involving specialized services;
4) Providers' collective
provision of non-fee-related in-
formation;
5) Providers' collective
provision of fee-related informa-
tion;
6) Provider participation
in exchanges of price and cost
information;
7) Joint purchasing ar-
rangements among providers;
8) Policy on physician
network joint ventures; and
9) Analytical principles
relating to multiprovider net-
works.
Many of these guidelines apply to areas
that might be covered by state legislation con-
cerning cooperative agreements among hospitals
or among health care providers, depending on
the scope of the particular statute. These guide-
lines and the accompanying analytical explana-
tions may enable health care providers to pro-
ceed with various arrangements that will promote
efficiencies in the health care market with some
decreased risk of antitrust enforcement.
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Thoughtful application of antitrust laws may be
an effective way to achieve the goals sought by
the state-action immunity laws with fewer un-
anticipated adverse consequences.' 25 The pro-
mulgation of these guidelines seems to have less-
ened the impetus for states to enact hospital co-
operation laws. The increased clarity of federal
enforcement policy may enable health care pro-
viders to achieve the benefits of joint endeavors
with less hassle126 and more certainty 2 7 than uti-
lizing the state-enacted hospital cooperation laws.
Providers will surely try first to fit within the
guidelines and only resort to the hospital coop-
eration laws as a second choice. That there has
been only one major use of hospital cooperation
legislation (Minnesota's) suggests that these pro-
cedures are still less attractive to hospitals than
the traditional federal antitrust review process. 128
The impact of hospital cooperation laws
on consumers
A. The hospital cooperation laws
may have a negligible impact on consumers as
they may be used only infrequently. There are
three reasons why this may be so: first, there will
be uncertainty that the state procedures will be
sufficient to confer antitrust immunity; second,
receiving immunity may entail such significant
state supervision as to be costly and burdensome;
and third, the federal guidelines may provide an
alternate and more certain method to achieve the
same end.
1. In order to confer immunity under the
Parker state-action immunity doctrine, a state
must clearly articulate its intention to displace
competition with regulation and must actively
supervise the actions of the parties immunized
from antitrust scrutiny. The hospital coopera-
tion laws probably meet the clear articulation test.
The active supervision requirement poses the
nettlesome problem.
To satisfy the strictures of Parker, a state
must ensure that the policies being pursued by
private parties are those of the government. This
requires that the supervision by government be
hands-on; actual'2 9 and ongoing 30 exercise of
supervisory authority is necessary for Parker
immunity to attach.
In Tennessee, by way of example, the stat-
ute authorizes active and continuing oversight
of cooperative agreements by the department of
health and the attorney general, and the proposed
regulations require quarterly reports and allow
for additional oversight. If the health department
actually acts upon the reports and periodically
actively reviews the approved cooperative ar-
rangements, that may be sufficient. But to
achieve Parker immunity, the state would have
to affirmatively approve or disapprove 3' the
"specific details"'3 2  of the "particular
anticompetitive acts of private parties"' 3 3 to as-
sure that the "anticompetitive scheme is the
State's own."'34
Few of the other states have statutory pro-
visions for active supervision. 3 5 Because of the
lack of statutory provisions, hospitals or health
care providers acting cooperatively with the ap-
proval of the state health department may never-
theless find themselves subject to antitrust laws
because the state supervision was not sufficiently
active. It will be difficult for parties to such
agreements to know their status with certainty.
The parties will have no control over their own
supervision; nor will they have the ability to re-
quire the state through the health department to
exercise active supervision. 3 6 Because of this
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uncertainty, providers have not (and may not)
make much use of the state hospital cooperation
laws.
2. Even if the statute and regulations pro-
vide for adequate supervision to satisfy the
Parker standards, and even if the state agencies
actually exercise their statutorily-conferred su-
pervisory powers, hospitals and other providers
may not utilize the state statutes because of the
loss of decisionmaking autonomy and the bur-
densome costs. The
intrusiveness and the
transaction costs of
complying with the
required supervision
may be greater than
the advantage to be
gained from the co-
operation agreement.
That is, merging a
service currently of-
fered by two hospi-
they will not pursue enforcement efforts. In such
circumstances, there is a much-reduced antitrust
risk. Even though antitrust courts are not bound
by the DOJ/FFC guidelines, and private parties
can bring antitrust actions, the antitrust risk is
likely to be sufficiently small so that a private
party will see no compelling reason, as a practi-
cal matter, to apply for a state's blessing by com-
plying with the necessarily cumbersome and ex-
pensive state procedures.
The intrusiveness and the
transaction costs of complying
with the required supervision
may be greater than the
advantage to be gained from
the cooperation agreement.
As a result, applica-
tions for approval of
cooperative agree-
ments likely will in-
volve situations that
fall outside the fed-
eral guidelines and
thus entail more risk
of anticompetitive
pricing and in-
creased costs to con-
sumers.
Further-
tals might be economically efficient for both hos-
pitals. However, the costs of demonstrating the
advantages of the collective conduct, of produc-
ing on a continuing basis the reports required to
show the savings and the use of the savings,"3
and of complying with site visits or any other
such requirements might be greater than the sav-
ings generated. It may be a Catch 22 situation:
if the supervision is sufficient to confer immu-
nity, its costs might exceed the benefits to be
gained.
3. The federal guidelines remove from
DOJ/FTC antitrust enforcement scrutiny many
arrangements that the hospital cooperation laws
may have been intended to cover. If an agree-
ment fits within the federal guidelines, the fed-
eral enforcement agencies have announced that
more, the DOJ/FTC guidelines provide an alter-
native procedure to the state process. Under the
guidelines, the federal antitrust enforcement
agencies have promised to respond to business
review or advisory opinion requests within 90
days after all necessary information is received.138
Thus, instead of going through the state proce-
dure, the parties may prefer to utilize the federal
procedure. It is not clear which procedure will
be more time-consuming and costly. The fed-
eral review process has the advantage of less
uncertainty - assuring parties of the enforce-
ment decision of the federal antitrust agencies.
Private antitrust actions, however, remain avail-
able. While the state procedures confer immu-
nity if effective, there is always the risk that the
supervision by the appropriate state agency will
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be inadequate to confer immunity successfully
under the Parker state-action doctrine.
B. Cooperative agreements may
lead to efficiencies, but they also have the po-
tential to be cozy arrangements for the benefit of
the participants to the detriment of payers for
health care. In most fields, competition is gen-
erally regarded as the best method of supplying
consumers with goods and services of a given
quality at the lowest price. Meaningful price
competition among health care providers stimu-
lated by the interest of employers, unions, insur-
ance companies and other payers in containing
health care costs is emerging in some areas of
the country. 139 Managed care entities that super-
vise the quality and quantity of care given their
enrollees and that, by their aggregation of pa-
tients into large groups can bargain effectively
with health care providers for reduced rates, are
becoming more widespread."4 The possibility
of effectively using market competition to re-
strain health care costs will be diminished or even
eliminated in some areas if states allow coop-
erative agreements among health care providers
to reduce the number of providers so that insuf-
ficient numbers remain for competition among
them to be effective. States must be cognizant
of this problem and not foreclose the possibility
of using competition to reduce costs by approv-
ing cooperative agreements that eliminate the
possibility of competition. 4 ' Although some
commentators assert that the health care indus-
try is different and price competition is not suit-
able, 42 recent studies'43 and other reported in-
formation'" regarding the effectiveness of com-
petition to reduce costs but maintain quality 45
would seem to counter this argument. "
Hospitals traditionally have used their in-
sulation from price competition to cost shift -
that is, to charge different payers different prices.
Cost shifting enabled hospitals to subsidize in-
digent care, specialized services, medical edu-
cation, research or other worthy endeavors. Ef-
fective competition reduces the ability of hospi-
tals to cost shift. 47 Hospital cooperation laws
may enable hospitals and other health care pro-
viders to maintain or reestablish the conditions
necessary for cost shifting."48 If this is the case,
application of the hospital cooperation laws may
mean increased costs for many payers and in-
creased surpluses for the hospitals. These sur-
pluses would then provide hospitals with funds
to apply elsewhere. There is a real problem of
accountability in this type of effort. The magni-
tude of the subsidy is blurred, and careful atten-
tion to trade-offs is difficult in this context. 49
The impact of the hospital cooperation
laws on the consumer will also depend on how
the health departments and attorneys general
evaluate the statutory benefits and disadvantages
of the cooperation agreements. Evaluation of the
statutory benefits and disadvantages will be dif-
ficult and almost any result can probably be jus-
tified. For one thing the benefits and disadvan-
tages are not ranked in order of importance.
Additionally the statutory benefits themselves are
inherently contradictory. 50 Some benefits are
directed at increased efficiency and cost control
while others are directed at quality and geo-
graphic access. Enhancement of the quality of
care in hospitals and preservation of geographic
access to hospitals are likely to increase costs.
However, gains in cost efficiency are likely to
reduce costs or slow the rate of cost increase. It
is not clear whether the two other benefits in-
crease or decrease costs. Improvements in utili-
zation of hospital resources may be achieved by
consolidating under-used services that might
lower costs. Subsidizing increased utilization of
hospital resources, on the other hand, is likely to
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increase costs. Avoiding duplication of hospital
resources may serve to increase efficiency and
reduce prices, or it may serve to increase market
power and increase prices. Since the benefits
are not prioritized, the process is highly politi-
cized, with the health department and the attor-
ney general possibly disagreeing on the evalua-
tion of the overall public benefit to be achieved
by the cooperative agreement. The resolution of
competing statutory goals will take place in a
forum where the process could be tilted to favor
the highly organized and concentrated interests.
The typical statute does set a standard that
the benefits must outweigh the disadvantages by
clear and convincing evidence. This gives guid-
ance to those applying the statute that the ben-
efits, which ever ones are decided to be most
important, must be significantly greater than the
disadvantages. But this is a very hard standard
to apply, and judicial review is likely to be ex-
tremely deferential. On balance, it is appropri-
ate to view these provider-cooperation statutes
with some skepticism, particularly as evidence
accrues that competition in the health care in-
dustry results in desirable outcomes when prop-
erly structured. There is a real risk of market
distortion from hidden taxation and the super-
session of federal antitrust laws.1 51
Conclusion
There are insufficient data to reach a firm
conclusion regarding the benefits to or effects
on consumers of hospital or provider coopera-
tion legislation based on the actual application
of these laws. The one major decision,
Minnesota's decision to allow the merger of two
hospital systems in Minneapolis/St. Paul, was
reached after consideration of the efficiencies to
be realized and of mechanisms to pass the cost
savings on to the purchasers of health care. Since
this merger was in a major metropolitan area, it
is likely that significant competition remained.
The Minnesota decision was a thoughtful evalu-
ation of costs and efficiencies and the effect of
the merger on the market. But even in that case,
a thoughtful and knowledgeable analyst has ex-
pressed skepticism about the benefits for con-
sumers.
52
Competition is working to reduce costs
in markets where structures conducive to effec-
tive competition exist. This result will likely
expand as managed care grows. This is shown
in studies of recent data and in anecdotal news-
paper coverage. Massachusetts in a short period
of time has passed California as the state with
the highest percentage of people enrolled in man-
aged care entities.'53 Most people live in popu-
lation centers which either have competitive
health care markets or potentially competitive
markets. It is clearly not desirable for state im-
munity laws to eliminate competition or the pos-
sibility of competition in markets where the
population is large enough to support competing
hospitals or competing managed care plans.
Even if price competition is not yet active in an
area, foreclosing the possibility eliminates the
efficiencies that may be realized in the future.
State policy makers should be extremely cautious
regarding cooperative agreements among health
care providers just as competitive forces are
emerging that will rationalize the efficiency of
the health care marketplace to the benefit of con-
sumers. This is a time for prudence before re-
establishing the regulatory paradigm, based on
possibly outdated data, just as newer evidence
strongly suggests the viability of and benefits
from properly structured competition and appro-
priate incentives in the health care arena.
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Compare Frederic J. Entin et al., Hospital Collaboration: The
Need for anAppropriateAntitrust Policy, 29 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 107 (1994) with David L. Meyer & Charles F. (Rick)
Rule, Health Care Collaboration Does Not Require Substan-
tive Antitrust Reform, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 169 (1994).
There is a serious question whether the goals of a regulatory
regime are (or can be, politically) confined to the achieve-
ment of economic efficiency. Cross-subsidization of preferred
services rather than economic efficiency may be the driving
force for regulation. That requires the generation and recap-
turing of supra-competitive returns, which in turn are depen-
dent on and necessitate a less-than-competitive economic
environment. See James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform
and Competing Visions of Medical Care: Antitrust and State
Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1459,
1498-1501 (1994) [hereinafter Blumstein, Competing Vi-
sions].
2 See infra text accompanying notes 42 & 43.
3 For an early discussion of the case for greater emphasis on
market-oriented policies in the health care industry, see James
F. Blumstein & FrankA. Sloan, Redefining Government's Role
in Health Care: Is a Dose of Competition What the Doctor
Should Order?, 34 VAND. L. REV. 849 (198 1).
See Blumstein, Competing Visions, supra note I, at 1482.
5 Id. at 1482-86.
6 See James M. Klingensmith, Applying Antitrust Concepts to
the Acute Care Hospital Industry: Defining the Relevant
Market for Hospital Services, 13 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L.
153, 154(1988).
Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. II
1990). See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,
457 U.S. 332 (1982); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
Sherman Antitrust Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. II
1990). See Morgenstern, M.D. v. Wilson, M.D., 29 F.3d
1291 (8th Cir. 1994).
Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988). See Barr Lab., Inc. v.
Abbott Lab., 978 F.2d 98 (3rd Cir. 1992); Advanced Health-
Care Services, Inc. v. Radford Community Hosp., 910 F2d
139 (4th Cir. 1990).
'
0Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988). See U.S. v. Carilion
Health System, 707 F Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1989); U.S. v.
Rockford Memorial Corporation, 717 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D.
II1. 1989), aft'd, 89 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 920 (1990).
"Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (1995).
See American Medical Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 94
F.T.C. 701 (1979), affirmed as modified, 638 F.2d 443 (2d
Cir. 1980), and affirmed by an equally divided court, 452
U.S. 678 (1982); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Indiana Fed'n of
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
'
2Robinson-Patman Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1988). The
Robinson-Patman provision establishes fairness among com-
petitors rather than economic efficiency as its primary objec-
tive. This provision has been much criticized by commenta-
tors. See Klingensmith, supra note 6, at 154-55. To the ex-
tent that state provider-cooperation laws immunize conduct
that is pro-competitive but that could violate Robinson-
Patman, then economic efficiency might well be enhanced.
13See Meyer & Rule, supra note 1, at 179.
Ile federal antitrust enforcement agencies have formulated
guidelines regarding their exercise of prosecutorial discre-
tion in administering the antitrust laws. If conduct falls within
the safety zones spelled out in those guidelines, then no en-
forcement action will be pursued by the agencies. See U.S.
Dept. of Justice and Federal Trade Comm'n, Statements of
Enforcement Policy and Analytical Principles Relating to
Health Care and Antitrust (Sept. 27, 1994), reprinted in 4
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 13,152 at 20,769.
'"These provider cooperation laws have been enacted under the
state-action antitrust immunity doctrine. See Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943). For a discussion of the development of
this doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 70-74. Un-
der the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2, state laws that conflict with or that
are inconsistent with federal laws are unconstitutional. See,
e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977). Under
Parker, however, federal antitrust laws do not apply to cer-
tain state and state-approved anticompetitive private conduct.
Parker thus reverses the general principle that federal laws
prevail over state laws. See Blumstein, Competing Visions,
supra note I at 1486-87. See also James F. Blumstein, Fed-
eralism and Civil Rights: Complementary and Competing
Paradigms, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1251, 1255, 1297-98 (1994).
16 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11 - 1303(d) (1994). The states
of Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyo-
ming have similar formulations based on balancing possible
benefits against anticompetitive effects. See infra Table I
(Hospital Operation Laws). In contrast to this balancing of
overall benefits against anticompetitive effects, antitrust laws
eliminate non-efficiency-based criteria from analytical con-
sideration. See Thomas E. Kauper, The Role of Quality of
Health Care Considerations in Antitrust Analysis, 51 LAW &
CoNTEMP. PROBS. 273, 292-93 (Spring 1988) (asserting con-
sumer welfare model of antitrust enforcement focuses "solely
on allocative and productive efficiency," and that "prevailing
antitrust standards are largely in accord with this 'consumer
welfare model"'.)
"See, e.g., Harold S. Luft et al, The Role of Specialized Clinical
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Services in Competition Among Hospitals, 23 INQUIRY 83, 93
(1986) [hereinafter Luft et al., Specialized Clinical Services]
(asserting that competition among hospitals focused on at-
tracting physicians through the offer of specialized services
and that this type of competition led to a proliferation of clini-
cal services and cost inflation); James C. Robinson & Harold
Luft, The Impact of Hospital Market Structure on Patient
Volume, Average Length of Stay, and the Cost of Care, 4 J.
HEALTH ECON. 333, 353-54 (1985) [hereinafter Robinson &
Luft, Hospital Market Structure] (supporting the hypothesis
that in a cost-based mode of reimbursement greater competi-
tion is associated with higher rather than lower costs); James
C. Robinson & Harold S. Luft, Competition and the Cost of
Hospital Care, 1972 to 1982, 257 JAMA 3241, 3244 (1987)
[hereinafter Robinson & Luft, Competition and Cost] (pre-
senting data indicating that hospital costs were substantially
higher in more competitive markets consistent with the "medi-
cal arms race" hypothesis that competition among hospitals
took the form of cost-increasing acquisition of new technol-
ogy attractive to physicians and patients); J. MichealWoolley
& H.E. Frech, III, How Hospitals Compete: A Review of the
Literature, 2 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 57,65-75 (1988-89)
[hereinafter Woolley & Frech, How Hospitals Compete] (cit-
ing many studies which generally showed under various meth-
odologies that competitive hospital markets had higher prices);
Jack Zwanziger and Glenn A. Melnick, The Effects of Hospi-
tal Competition and the Medicare PPS Program on Hospital
Cost Behavior in California, 7 J. HEALTH ECON. 301, 301-305
(1988) [hereinafter Zwanziger & Melnick, Competition and
the Medicare PPS Program] (discussing studies using data
from 1970s and early 1980s showing higher costs in com-
petitive markets).
18 Milt Freudenheim, Doctors Are Sparring with Insurers over
Right to Join Health Networks, N.Y. TIMES, JULY 12, 1994, at
A8.
9 See Woolley & Frech, How Hospitals Compete, supra note 17,
at 58, 61; Robinson & Luft, Competition and Cost, supra
note 17, at 3244; and Luft, et al., Specialized Clinical Ser-
vices, supra note 17, at 83.
2 See Larry M. Manheim & Joe Feinglass, Hospital Cost Incen-
tives in a Fragmented Health Care System, 19(1) HEALTH CARE
MGMT. REV. 56,56(1994); David Dranove, et al., Price and
Concentration in Hospital Markets: The Switch from Patient-
Driven to Payer-Driven Competition, 36 J. L. & ECON. 179,
179-181 (1993) [hereinafter Dranove et al., Payer-Driven
Competition]; Woolley & Frech, How Hospitals Compete,
supra note 17, at 60-61.
21 See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE 5 (1982); Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of
Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost Con-
tainment, 137 U. PA. L. Rev. 431,445-47 (1988).
2See Woolley & Frech, How Hospitals Compete, supra note 17,
at 59.
See Blumstein, Competing Visions, supra note 1, at 1463-1464.
54Starr, supra note 21, at 226-27. Starr has argued that the domi-
nance of professionals has perpetuated the imbalance in in-
formation available to patients, and thereby has perpetuated
professional power vis a vis patients. That is, professional-
ism may in part be a cause, not just a response, to market
failure (the asymmetry of information between physician and
patient).
5 See Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics
of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941,947-49 (1963). (ar-
guing that the professional paradigm is a response to market
failure in the medical care marketplace - the unpredictable
nature of the need for medical care and the ignorance of the
consumer); Starr, supra note 21, at 226-27 (noting that un-
certainty and consumer ignorance may be promoted by the
professional paradigm, thereby perpetuating the empower-
ment of professionals in medical care decisionmaking).
See Luft, et al., Specialized Clinical Services, supra note 17,
at 83; Woolley & Frech, How Hospitals Compete, supra
note 17, at 60-61.
57See Luft, et al., Specialized Clinical Services, supra note 17,
at 83.
See Dranove, et al., Payer-Driven Competition, supra note
20, at 180; Glenn A. Melnick, The Effects of Market Struc-
ture and Bargaining Position on Hospital Prices, I l J. HEALTH
ECON. 217, 231 (1992) [hereinafter Melnick, Market Struc-
ture and Bargaining Position]; James C. Robinson, HMO
Market Penetration and Hospital Cost Inflation in Califor-
nia, 266 JAMA 2719, 2723 (1991) [hereinafter Robinson,
HMO Market Penetration]; Zwanziger & Melnick, Competi-
tion and the Medicare PPS Program, supra note 17, at 316;
and Jack Zwanziger et al, Cost and Price Competition in Cali-
fornia Hospitals, 1980-1990, 13 HEALTH AFF. 118, 124 (Fall
1994) [hereinafter Zwanziger et al., California Hospitals,
1980-1990].
"See Robinson & Luft, Competition and Cost, supra note 17, at
3241.
' See id. at 3244; Zwanziger & Melnick, Hospital Competition
and the Medicare PPS Program, supra note 17, at 305. For a
more generalized discussion of the relationship between the
nature of competition and the containment of costs, see Tho-
mas L. Greaney, Managed Competition, Integrated Delivery
Systems and Antitrust, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1513-14
(1994).
31 See Luft, et al., Specialized Clinical Services, supra note 17, at
92.
32See Luft, et al., Specialized Clinical Services, supra note 17, at
93; Robinson & Luft, Competition and Cost, supra note 17,
at 3241.
13 See Luft, et al., Specialized Clinical Services, supra note 17, at
91.
See generally Robert C. Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit
the HospitalIndustry?, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1416 (1980); Philip
C. Kissam et al., Antitrust and Hospital Privileges: Testing
the Conventional Wisdom, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 595 (1982).
35See Luft, et al., Specialized Clinical Services, supra note 17, at
83. See also Hall, supra note 21, at 506.
36 See Luft, et al., Specialized Clinical Services, supra note 17, at
93.
37Robinson & Luft, Hospital Market Structure, supra note 17, at
342. See also United States v. Carilion Health System, 707
F Supp. 840, 846 (W.D. Va. 1989).
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38Critics of the use of markets in medical care often have relied
on those studies to suggest that the market for medical care
was different, that competition could not achieve its tradi-
tional objective of economic efficiency. See, e.g., Entin et
al., supra note I. As the later studies have shown, see infra
notes 50-54, and as current anecdotal experience is demon-
strating, the market in medical care responds to incentives as
in other markets. Where, as in regulated industries, the terms
of competition are constrained, the consequences of compe-
tition may be socially ill-adaptive. The policy issue then be-
comes what policy pathway to pursue - give up on the mar-
ket and impose a regulatory solution that substitutes for the
market, or improve the functioning of the market to create an
appropriate set of incentives.
39 See Robinson & Luft, Hospital Market Structure, supra note
17, at 354. An alternative explanation of the evidence might
be to focus on market conditions from the position of the
dominant physicians. In seemingly competitive markets,
conditions were advantageous to physicians upon whose re-
ferrals hospitals relied to fill patient beds. In effect, for the
physicians prices went down (or value of services went up).
In more concentrated markets, the margins available to phy-
sicians were recaptured by the hospitals, which had more
market leverage. From the perspective of physicians, prices
went up in those markets, as there was less surplus made avail-
able to referring physicians, upon whom such hospitals were
presumably less dependent.
'See infra notes 94, 95 and accompanying text.
4Health care costs rose sufficiently - both in terms of rate of
increase and absolute levels of expenditure - to attract seri-
ous employer attention. Employers became willing to con-
front the difficult employee-relationship issues involved in
changing or limiting an unconstrained fee-for-service system.
Insurance companies modified their range of options to ac-
commodate employer concerns and to compete with HMOs.
Historically, physicians have resisted perceived inroads
on their professional autonomy by engaging in collective ac-
tion. See, e.g., American Medical Ass'n v. United States,
317 U.S. 519 (1943) (holding a refusal by fee-for-service
physicians to deal with HMO physicians to be a violation of
the Sherman Act). At one time, there was some question about
the scope of antitrust applicability to professional activity.
See United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S.
326, 336 (1952) (stating that "forms of competition usual in
the business world may be demoralizing to the ethical stan-
dards of a profession"). Faced with this type of potential
collective resistance and the uncertain status of antitrust en-
forcement against such collective physician conduct, payers
were understandably reluctant to take aggressive cost-con-
tainment measures.
That the antitrust laws apply to professional activity
is now settled. National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). Collective action relating to fees,
even for purported reasons of improving professional qual-
ity, violates the antitrust laws. See FTC v. Superior Court
Trial Lawyers Ass'n., 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (holding that col-
lective refusal of court-appointed trial lawyers in criminal
defenses cases to accept appointment because of low fee lev-
els constituted a per se violation of the antitrust law). See
also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S.
332 (1982) (holding maximum fee agreements among physi-
cians, arranged by the Maricopa County Medical Society, to
be per se unlawful price fixing agreements); In re Michigan
State Medical Society, 101 FT.C. 191 (1983) (invalidating
physicians' collective conduct in negotiating with Blue Cross/
Blue Shield regarding the insurer's cost-containment efforts).
In a recent example, the Justice Department charged that hos-
pitals in Danbury, Connecticut and St. Joseph, Missouri joined
with physicians in illegal price fixing schemes to keep out
lower-cost managed care companies. Both hospitals oper-
ated in monopoly situations. The cases were settled by con-
sent decrees. See Thomas J. Lueck, Illegal Price-Fixing
Charged in Danbury Hospital Suit, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14,
1995, at B6. For further cases and discussion, see Greaney,
supra note 30, at 1524, and Meyer & Rule, supra note 1, at
183-86. These antitrust decisions have limited the ability of
physicians and physician organizations to resist competition
and inhibit the formation of innovative methods of providing
care and containing cost.
'
2 See Glenn A. Melnick & Jack Zwanziger, Hospital Behavior
under Competition and Cost-Containment Policies: The Cali-
fornia Experience, 1980 to 1985, 260 JAMA 2669, 2669
(1988) [hereinafter Melnick & Zwanziger, The California
Experience, 1980-85]; Robinson, HMO Market Penetration,
supra note 28, at 2719.
43 See David Dranove & William D. White, Recent Theory and
Evidence on Competition in Hospital Markets, 3 J. EcON. &
MGMT. STRATEGY 169, 193-94 (1994); Melnick & Zwanziger,
The California Experience, 1980 to 1985, supra note 42, at
2669; James C. Robinson & Harold S. Luft, Competition,
Regulation, and Hospital Costs, 1982 to 1986, 260 JAMA
2676, 2676 (1988) [hereinafter Robinson & Luft, Competi-
tion, Regulation, and Hospital Costs]; Robinson, HMO Mar-
ket Penetration, supra note 28, at 2719; Zwanziger & Melnick,
Competition and the Medicare PPS Program, supra note 17,
at 316-17; Jack Zwanziger et al, Hospitals andAntitrust: De-
fining Markets, Setting Standards, 19 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y
AND L. 423, 424 (1994) [hereinafter Zwanziger et al., Defin-
ing Markets, Setting Standards]; Jack Zwanziger et al, Cali-
fornia Hospitals, 1980-1990, supra note 28, at 123.
"Social Security Amendments of 1983, § 42 U.S.C.A. 1395ww
(West 1992 and Supp. 1995).
'
5Prior to the adoption of PPS, Medicare had reimbursed provid-
ers on the basis of their costs. Under cost-based reimburse-
ment, there are no incentives to contain costs; increased costs
result in increased reimbursement. DRGs are specified con-
ditions for which Medicare will pay a fixed amount based on
the average costs to treat the condition. If a hospital is able to
treat the condition for less than the average amount, the hos-
pital may retain the amount. However, the hospital is at risk
for treatment costs above the DRG payment. For a descrip-
tion of the DRG system, see Kathryn G. Sophy, Comment,
Diagnosis Related Groups and the Price of Cost Contain-
ment, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 305, 306-07 (1986)
and Judith R. Lave, The Impact of the Medicare Prospective
Payment System and Recommendations for Change, 7 YALE
J. ON REG. 499, 505-07 (1990).
'A Health Maintenance Organization ("HMO") provides com-
prehensive health services to a defined population, its enroll-
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ees, in return for a fixed payment per enrollee. There are sev-
eral different organizational models for HMOs. The physi-
cians who provide care to the enrollees may be employed by
one HMO and only have those HMO enrollees as their pa-
tients; alternatively, the physicians may have contractual re-
lationships with one or more HMOs and may see only HMO
enrollees or may also see other patients. Some HMOs are
mixed models. Since payment to the HMO is fixed regard-
less of the medical care needed, the HMO has incentives to
use cost effective care. Thus HMOs try to reduce hospital
based care and specialist care through oversight and economic
incentives to providers and try to contract with providers who
offer cost effective care. Depending on the type of HMO,
enrollees may have to pay entirely or partially for care pro-
vided by providers other than HMOs; thus enrollees have great
incentives to use the HMO providers. This in turn gives
HMOs bargaining power with respect to providers regarding
price and quality. See Stephen S. Boochever, Health Mainte-
nance Organizations in ALTERNATIVE DELIVERY SYSTEMS:
HMO's, PPO's AND CMPs (Jeanie M. Johnson, ed. 1986);
John F. Shields et al., The Cost of Legislative Restrictions on
Contracting Practices: The Cost to Government, Employers
and Families, Lewin-VHI, Inc., Report to Healthcare Lead-
ership Council, Alliance for Managed Care, and Health In-
surance Association of America, ii-iii (June 21, 1995);
Lawrence P. Casalino, Balancing Incentives: How Should
Physicians Be Reimbursed?, 267 JAMA 403,404 (1992); and
Daniel K. Zismer, Physician Incentives in a Managed Care
World, 37 HEALTHCARE F.J. 39 (Sept.Oct. 1994).
4 A Preferred Provider Organization ("PPO") is a discounted
fee-for-service system with varying degrees of treatment over-
sight with regard to hospital and specialist use. Providers in
the PPO agree to discount the services they provide to a des-
ignated population. If those persons insured under a PPO do
not use the designated PPO providers, they are required to
pay higher co-payments. Providers in a PPO have incentives
to provide efficient care because of the discount; however,
they also have incentives to increase the volume of care pro-
vided. The higher co-payment which PPO insureds are re-
quired to pay to non-PPO providers gives the insureds incen-
tives to use PPO providers. This control of patient behavior
gives PPOs the ability to bargain with their providers regard-
ing price and quality. See Michael F Anthony, Preferred Pro-
vider Organizations in ALTERNATIVE DELIVERY SYSTEMS:
HMO's, PPO's AND CMP's (Jeanie M. Johnson, ed. 1986);
Shields, supra note 46, at ii-iii; Casalino, supra note 46, at
403; Zismer, supra note 46, at 39.
4 See Melnick & Zwanziger, The California Experience 1980-
1985, supra note 42, at 2670. The Federal Health Mainte-
nance Act of 1973 preempts state laws that inhibit or prevent
the formation of HMOs. See 42 USC § 300e-10 (1988).
Some state HMO legislation expands the federal legislation
and enables HMOs to employ physicians rather than to con-
tract with a professional corporation of physicians to pro-
vide services. Additionally, state HMO legislation allowed
business corporations to form HMOs. See, e.g., TENN. CODE
ANN. § 56-32-201 to 225 (1994). Although HMOs existed
prior to the adoption of the 1973 federal legislation, the fed-
eral law (as amended) enabled and stimulated the formation
of HMOs, which were organized to compete on the basis of
price as well as quality.
49See Melnick & Zwanziger, The California Experience, 1980-
1985, supra note 42, at 2675; Robinson, HMO Market Pen-
etration, supra note 28, at 2723; Dranove, et al., Payer-Driven
Competition, supra note 20, at 180-81. The rate of increase
in inpatient costs adjusted for inflation increased at an aver-
age rate of almost 5% in 1980-82 and decreased by almost
2% in the 1983-85 period. Melnick & Zwanziger, The Cali-
fornia Experience, 1980 to 1985, supra note 42, at 2672.
5
°Melnick & Zwanziger, The California Experience, 1980 -1985,
supra note 42, at 2669.
5
1 Id. at 2670.
52 ld. at 2672.
531 d. at 2673.
See Robinson, HMO Market Penetration, supra note 28, at
2723. However, the cost reductions achieved (9.4% lower
rate of inflation) are to be contrasted with the rate of cost
increase per admission during the period (74.5%).
55See Dranove, et al., Payer-Driven Competition, supra note 20,
at 179 and 182; Melnick, Market Structure and Bargaining
Position, supra note 28, at 231-32; Ron Winslow, Is Victory
in Sight in Health-Care War?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 1995, at
I (attributing a 1. 1% drop in average costs per employee from
a Foster Higgins survey of employers' shifts to enrollment in
managed care plans); Zwanziger & Melnick, Competition and
the Medicare PPS Program, supra note 17, at 316; Zwanziger
et al., California Hospitals, 1980-1990, supra note 28, at 123;
Zwanziger et al., Defining Markets, Setting Standards, supra
note 43, at 429; and Shields, supra note 46, at iv. For recent
data on health care cost reductions in California see Alain C.
Enthoven and Sara J. Singer, Managed Competition in the
California Health Care Economy, 14 HEALTH AFF. (Winter
1995).
' Under traditional health insurance plans, patients do not have
the same motivation to be cost conscious. In the absence of
substantial deductibles and copayments, patients face little
incentive to be cost conscious. Even with co-payments, there
is the phenomenon of moral hazard, since patients' co-pay-
ments typically amount to 20% of expenses. The divergence
between individual cost and actual social cost in such cir-
cumstances is graphically depicted in Clark C. Havighurst &
James F. Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-offs in
Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 6, 17-
18 (1975).
Under traditional fee-for-service payment practices,
physicians' economic incentives are aligned with their pro-
fessional perception that more is better in medical care. Eco-
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in competitive markets. See Dranove, et al., Payer-Driven
Competition, supra note 20, at 201. California hospitals with
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supra note 43, at 442-44; and Zwanziger et al., California
Hospitals, 1980-1990, supra note 28, at 125.
61 See Zwanziger et al., Defining Markets, Setting Standards,
supra note 43, at 423.
2 See Meyer & Rule, supra note 1, at 182-220.
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the FTC: Efficiency Justifications in Hospital Mergers and
Vertical Integration Concerns, (Remarks Before the Health
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1995); in Montana there are no supervision provisions; in
Nebraska annual reports are required by NEB. REV. STAT. §
71-7708 (1994); in New York there are no supervision provi-
sions; in North Carolina periodic reports with specified in-
formation are required by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-192.9
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tion, what priorities are being pursued? Presumably, the su-
pervisory state agency would have to review and adopt as its
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